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Tradecraft, Cover, and Trails of Evidence, 43ĥ. Organizations and the Human Condition, 35 Intelligence Activities and Plausible Deniability, 3Ģ. THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY.ĪCKNOWLEDGMENTS.ivġ. QUOTATION FROM, ABSTRACTION FROM, OR REPRODUCTION OF ALL OR ANY PART OF THIS DOCUMENT IS PERMITTED PROVIDED PROPER ACKNOWLEDGMENT IS MADE, INCLUDING THE AUTHOR'S NAME, PAPER TITLE, AND THE STATEMENT: "WRITTEN IN FULFILLMENT OF A REQUIREMENT FOR THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE." THIS IS AN OFFICIAL DOCUMENT OF THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE. Me the opportunity to participate in a unique learning experience. University, Command and Staff College for allowing Officers and civilian faculty of the U.S.M.C. Additionally, I would like to acknowledge the military Richard Kinsman, and my third reader and year-longįaculty advisor, Dr. I would also like to give special thanks to my thesis advisor, Dr. George Jonas for his candid conversation regarding Avner's team, Government agencies are capable ofĬonducting decentralized, sensitive operations with reasonable operational control and an When operational teams incorporate decentralized authority in concert with good tradecraftĪnd tactical techniques, success is virtually assured. Initiate actions as circumstances dictate, enhancing the operational success-failure ratio.
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Operations demand a flexible capability with full decentralized authority enabling officers to Bureaucracies cannot move effectively beyond a predetermined operational tempo,Īnd impose fatal restraints regarding operational tradecraft and tactics. Governmentīureaucracies inherently limit the degree of operational success by the nature of their Operations must have a firm understanding of bureaucratic processes. Lessons may be gleaned from this study for policy makers. Policies, specifically those addressing the use of assassination as a political tool, important Recommendations: Although there are inherent differences between Israeli and U.S. The second team which operated withįull decentralized authority and freedom of movement achieved significant success inįulfilling their operational objectives and never compromised the operation. Mission and publicly exposed the entire operation. The assassination team deployed through normal channels failed to complete their
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Mechanisms and let them operate with complete anonymity outside the government The theory was to support this team financially through covert Unit recruited staff officers and highly trained specialists and set them outside the arm andĬontrol of the government. Regional stations and managed through standard Mossad headquarters' procedures.
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The Mossad headquarters elementĭeveloped one team utilizing staff operations officers supported by recruited assets of Specific mission parameters and methods of operation. ToĪccomplish the directive, the Mossad developed several assassination teams, each with The Mossad assumed the responsibility for implementing the panel's directive. To authorize the assassination of any Black September terrorists involved in the Munich The panel concluded that the most effective response was Meir tasked the committee with devising an appropriate 'Committee-X' devised a campaign in retaliation for the massacre of eleven Israeli's during Golda Meir and the Israeli cabinet's top secret In this counterterrorist effort were successful relative to the original operational objectives.īackground: In 1972, the Israeli Mossad initiated one of the most ambitious covertĬounterterrorist campaigns in history. Specifically, the study addresses whether the operational and tactical methods utilized Responsible for the attack on the Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympic games in Septemberġ972. Thesis: The purpose of this study is to examine the methodology of the covert action teamsĪuthorized by Prime Minister Golda Meir to find and assassinate those individuals Title: Countering Terrorism: The Israeli Response to the 1972 Munich Olympic MassacreĪnd the Development of Independent Covert Action Teams. The views in this paper are those of the author andĭo not reflect the official policy or position of theĭepartment of Defense or the U.S. In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College THE ISRAELI RESPONSE TO THE 1972 MUNICH OLYMPIC MASSACRE AND THEĭEVELOPMENT OF INDEPENDENT COVERT ACTION TEAMS